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Abstract. We present a simple model, where intraday and overnight interest
rates are linked by a no-arbitrage argument. The hourly interest rate is shown to be
a function of the intraday term structure of the overnight rate. This property holds
under both assumptions, where an explicit intraday market for interbank loans
exists and when it does not. In the ﬁrst case, such a property is an equilibrium
condition; in the second one it holds by deﬁnition, as a synthetic hourly loan is
a portfolio of overnight contracts. We then provide empirical evidence, based on
tick-by-tick data for the e-MID money market (covering the whole 2003). The
overnight rate shows a clear downward pattern throughout the operating day.
A positive hourly interest rate emerges from the intraday term structure of the
overnight rate: we estimate the market price of a one hour interbank loan to be
slightly above a half basis point.
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11 Introduction
Is there a market price for "intraday money"? The answer to this question
is interesting for banks, as it gives some insights for their liquidity manage-
ment and it helps understanding the working of payment systems, and it is
relevant for central banking, in particular for grasping the implications of
diﬀerent policies in the provision of intraday credit. Actually, an explicit
market for loans with shorter maturities than one day does not (yet) ex-
ist. The shortest maturity for which an interest rate is quoted in ﬁnancial
markets is everywhere the overnight. The rate prevailing in the overnight
interbank market is also the operational target of monetary policy in several
countries (including USA and the euro area). However, an implicit price for
intraday transactions does exist - despite the fact that such transactions do
not actually take place - whenever the overnight interest rate diﬀers, depend-
i n go nt h ee x a c tt i m e( w i t h i nt h es a m ed a y )a tw h i c ht h ed e l i v e r y / r e p a y m e n t
of funds takes place. So for example, the diﬀerence (if any) between the rate
c h a r g e do na no v e r n i g h tl o a nd e l i v e r e da t9a . m .a n dal o a nw i t ht h es a m e
maturity delivered at 10 a.m. implicitly deﬁnes the price of a one hour loan.
The reasons behind a positive intraday interest rate essentially rely on the
organization of payment systems and, more generally, on the way in which the
settlement of transactions is handled. When the bulk of payments were set-
tled through netting systems, a sort of "free intraday liquidity" was provided
by the netting mechanism itself: only the multilateral balance of payments
had to be settled at the end of the day. During the nineties, the real time gross
settlement (RTGS) has become widely used, particularly for large value pay-
ments. This method of handling payments is highly demanding: banks have
to maintain suﬃcient (idle) balances with the central bank, to be able to set-
tle payments one by one in real time; alternatively, they may rely on central
bank intraday credit, which also comes at some cost. The real time settle-
ment has become the common standard also for securities transactions, with
delivery versus payment (DVP). Finally, a payment-versus-payment (PVP)
2approach has been adopted by CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement), dealing
with foreign exchange transactions.
More recently, the trend towards "hybrid" systems - implementing a sort
of real time net settlement - has somehow reduced the liquidity needed for
settlement purposes. However, these systems also create an incentive for
banks to actively manage their liquidity during the operating day (for exam-
ple in order to optimally allocate the available liquidity to diﬀerent categories
of payments and to eﬃciently manage payment queues). A role for an ac-
tive intraday liquidity management is also created by several cut-oﬀ times to
be met by bank treasury departments during the day (think for example of
"timed payments" scheduled by CLS).1
On theoretical grounds, the emergence of an intraday interest rate in
the interbank market has been advocated by VanHoose (1991) and Angelini
(1998): they both model bank liquidity management at an intraday level,
distinguishing between a "morning session" and an "afternoon session". De-
spite some diﬀerences (the former focusses on trading in the interbank mar-
ket, while the latter focusses on the timing of payment orders processing),
they reach the same basic results: i) a positive value of the intraday inter-
est rate emerges as the equilibrium level in the interbank market; ii) such
a level crucially depends on the price of daylight overdrafts charged by the
central bank; iii) absent an explicit market for intraday transactions, the
intraday interest rate is computed as the diﬀerence between the overnight
rate on interbank loans delivered in the morning and the rate on loans deliv-
ered in the afternoon, providing an implicit price for money between the two
periods within the same day. The strategic choice of banks relative to the
timing of payment sending is also the core of the analysis done by Beck and
Garratt (2003), who assume that the interest rate in the (implicit) intraday
money market equals the cost of intraday liquidity supplied by the central
1Examples of hybrid systems are: RTGS-plus, PNS, New BI-Rel in Europe, and CHIPS
in USA. For a more detailed analysis of recent changes in payment systems and their
implications for central banking, see Baglioni (2005).
3bank: this cost either takes the form of an explicit fee or it is the opportu-
nity cost of pledging collateral. Finally, Zhou (2000) stresses the distinction
between "settlement debt" (intraday) and "consumption/investment debt"
(across days): only the latter aﬀects the intertemporal allocation of resources,
while the former arises for pure settlement purposes; under this approach a
"day" may be deﬁned as any length of time over which there is no point in
optimizing the timing of consumption and production.
The empirical evidence regarding the price of intraday liquidity is still
modest and not conclusive. As far as we know, the only analysis pointing
to the existence of an implicit market for intraday interbank lending has
been done by Furﬁne (2001): he ﬁnds that in the federal funds market an
additional hour is priced 0.9 basis point; this result is attributed to the cost
of borrowing from the central bank through the daylight overdraft facility.2.
Angelini (2000) does not ﬁnd any clear intraday pattern of the overnight
rate prevailing in the Italian screen-based interbank market (MID, 1993-1996
data): in particular, such rate turns out to be slightly (less than two basis
points) below its midday level both in the early morning and in the early
afternoon.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we want to make clear the theo-
retical relationship between intraday and overnight interest rates. As we are
going to see, they are linked by a no-arbitrage argument: the hourly interest
rate is determined by the intraday term structure of the overnight rate, where
the latter is deﬁned by the levels of the overnight rate for diﬀerent durations
of the contract. This property applies to both cases, where an explicit in-
traday market for interbank loans does exist and when it does not (in the
2The Fed charges an annualized daily rate of 36 basis points; this amounts to a 1.5 b.p.
hourly fee. The eﬀective daily rate is 27 b.p. (36 b.p. times 18/24, as Fedwire operating
hours are 18) divided by 360. The daily charge (neglecting the deductible) results from
the product between such a rate and the average per-minute overdraft incurred by a bank
in a day (see McAndrews and Rajan (2000) for more details). Therefore, repaying a 1
dollar federal fund loan one hour later enables a bank saving 1.5 basis points (annualized),
given that it is running an overdraft at the time of repayment.
4latter case, synthetic intraday loans are created through overnight contracts
delivered at diﬀerent times during the day). Second, we provide some em-
pirical evidence, based on tick-by-tick data for the e-MID euro-area money
market, showing that a positive hourly interest rate (implicitly) emerges in
t h eo v e r n i g h tm a r k e t :w ee s t i m a t et h em a r k e tp r i c eo fao n eh o u ri n t e r b a n k
loan to be slightly above a half basis point.
2 An arbitrage model for the intraday inter-
est rate
In this section we lay out a simple model, where intraday and overnight
interest rates are linked by a no-arbitrage argument. We focus on a single
day, and denote by t =0 ,1,...,24 the hours during the day: t =0denotes
the opening time of the interbank market (say 9 a.m.), t =1one hour later
and so forth until t =2 4(9 a.m. of the next day). The interbank market
closing time is T: in principle, it might be T =2 4 ; in practice, it is T<24;i n
the following, we will consider diﬀerent cases about the value of T. Assume
that all overnight interbank loans have to be repaid at t =2 4 . We call r0 the
interest rate on an overnight interbank loan delivered at t =0 ; r1 is the rate
on a loan delivered at t =1 ,a n ds of o r t hu n t i lrT. So the list [r0,r 1,...,r T]
describes the "intraday term structure" as the levels of the overnight rate for
diﬀerent durations: 24 hours, 23 hours, ..., 24 − T hours respectively.
2.1 An explicit market for hourly interbank loans
Assume that in the interbank market it is possible to trade on an hourly basis:
for example, a bank may borrow funds from t =2to t =3 . This assumption
is not realistic, and we are going to drop it in the next subsection, but it
is useful to begin our analysis; on theoretical grounds, it is equivalent to
assuming that there is no transaction cost. Assume further, for simplicity,
5that the hourly interest rate is constant throughout a single day, and it is
denoted by r ≥ 0 (we have discussed in the Introduction the reasons why r
might be strictly positive).
It is easy to see that the following no-arbitrage condition must hold in
equilibrium:
(1 + r)
t(1 + rt)=1+r0 for t =1 ,...,T (1)
In words, a roll-over strategy of investing in hourly contracts for t hours
(starting at t =0 ) and in an overnight contract for the remaining 24 − t
hours must provide the same return as a 24-hour length overnight contract.
Otherwise, arbitrage opportunities would arise. Condition (1) holds for both
r>0 and r =0 . In the latter case the intraday term structure is ﬂat (rt = r0
for t =1 ,...,T), while in the former case a decreasing intraday term structure
emerges (r0 >r 1 > ... > rT).




for t =1 ,...,T (2)
where the equilibrium (arbitrage free) hourly interest rate is a function
of the intraday term structure of the overnight rate.
F r o m( 2 )i ti se v i d e n tt h a tas p e c i ﬁc level of the overnight rate is com-
patible with any level of the hourly rate: the latter depends only on the
diﬀerence between overnight rates with diﬀerent durations, so the level of r0
is irrelevant for determining r.
This property fails to hold when T ≥ 23 (this is not a realistic case,
and we consider it only for completeness). It is intuitive to set r23 = r and
r24 =0 .T h e nf o rt =2 3 ,24 conditions (1) and (2) respectively become:
(1 + r)




implying that the level of the 24-hour overnight rate uniquely determines
6the level of the hourly rate: in fact, the latter is simply a fraction of the
former. This simple relation would hold if it were possible to replicate an
overnight contract with 24 hourly contracts. This is not true in practice.
2.2 An implicit market for hourly interbank loans
We come now to the more realistic assumption that transaction costs prevent
an explicit market for hourly interbank loans to arise. However, synthetic
hourly contracts may be created by making use of overnight loans with dif-
ferent delivery times. Then the hourly interest rate turns out to be implicitly
deﬁned by the intraday term structure of the overnight rate. Take for exam-
ple the following position in the overnight market: lend at t =0and borrow
at t =1 ; this is equivalent to lending for one hour and it gives a return equal
to r0 −r1. More generally, a synthetic long position in the interbank market
for t hours may be created by lending overnight at t =0and borrowing the
same amount at t (with 1 ≤ t ≤ T) ;t h eh o u r l yr e t u r no ns u c hap o s i t i o ni s
deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n( 2 ) . 3
Therefore, when the hourly interest rate is implicitly deﬁned by the intra-
day term structure of the overnight rate - as it is the case when no explicit
hourly market exists - the no-arbitrage condition (1) is trivially satisﬁed.
This is not surprising, as r is deﬁn e da sa ni m p l i c i tp r i c ei nt h eo v e r n i g h t
market, rather than being the equilibrium price of an explicit hourly market4.
Absent an explicit hourly market, the hourly interest rate r is not ob-
servable. However, equation (2) provides a way to estimate such rate by
exploiting the intraday term structure in the overnight market. Let us write
that equation as:
3Of course, a short position for t hours and its hourly cost are deﬁned in a similar way.
4Another way to look at this point is by considering a roll-over strategy of investing
in a synthetic long position for t hours (starting at t =0 ) and lending overnight for the
remaining 24−t hours: this boils down to lending overnight with a 24-hour length contract,
giving a return equal to r0; again, condition 1 is trivially met.
7rt = r0 − r · t (4)
where the overnight rate linearly depends on the time of delivery. The
estimated coeﬃcient of this regression line provides an empirical measure of
the hourly interest rate. This task is taken up in the next section.
3 Empirical analysis
An empirical analysis was performed using data from the e-MID money mar-
ket to investigate the existence of an implicit intraday market for bank liq-
uidity. E-MID is a screen-based market located in Milan and it is currently
the most liquid market in the euro zone for the exchange of interbank de-
posits. This market has expanded considerably in recent years and it is now
fully used by major European banks: indeed, non Italian banks account for
about 40% of daily trades (as of March 2005).
Dealings in e-MID start at 8 a.m. and end up at 6 p.m. One important
aspect of the market microstructure concerns the overnight contract: this has
a ﬁxed maturity time. In particular, dealings between Italian banks matures
at 9 a.m. of the day following the one in which the contract was made: at this
time previous day trades are settled in real time, as the borrowing bank has
to repay the amount due through a Target payment. Dealings involving - at
l e a s t-af o r e i g nb a n km a t u r e sb yn o o n( n e x td a y ) .T h i sf e a t u r ee n a b l e su st o
apply the framework introduced in the previous section, where the starting
time of a contract unambiguously determines the length of such a contract,
and this is known by both participants in the deal.
For the purposes of our analysis we consider trades (tick-by-tick data)
that occurred in the e-MID market from 2003:01:02 to 2003:12:29, for a total
of 125,536 observations5. In order to measure changes in the overnight rate
as a function of diﬀerent times of the day, we divided the day into 9 hourly
5We thank e-MID s.p.a. for providing this data set to us.
8time bands from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m., denoted by t =0 ,...,8. The period between
8.00 a.m. and 9.00 a.m. was not considered because trading in this period is
extremely volatile. For each working day the average daily overnight rate, the
average overnight rate for each hourly time band and the diﬀerences between
the latter and the former were calculated: these diﬀerences will be denoted by
rt in the following. By making use of interest rate diﬀerentials from the daily
average, instead of relying on their levels, we are able to insulate intraday
patterns - which are our focus - from day-to-day changes in money market
rates. Monthly aggregates were then computed: the regression below was
then run on 108 observations (9 times bands times 12 months).
It is then possible to see whether intraday changes in overnight rates are
linked to the diﬀerent hourly time bands. Before coming to the econometric
analysis, a quick look at the data is quite suggestive: see Figure 1, where
the diﬀerentials between the overnight rates in each time band and the daily
average are plotted (data are aggregated over the whole year 2003). The
intraday pattern of the overnight rate is clearly shown in the picture, with a
steady decline over the whole day - taking a break during lunch time. The
overall decrease amounts to 4.5 basis points.







































































The impression given by the picture is fully conﬁrmed by the econometric
analysis conducted on the sample data: we estimate the parameters of equa-
tion (5). This assumes that the overnight interest rate is a linear function of
the time when a trade takes place:
rt = c +
8 X
i=1
βi · xi + εt (5)
where c is the constant and εt is the usual white noise. The xi are dummy
variables - where i stands for the hourly time bands following the ﬁrst one
-t a k i n gv a l u e1w h e nt = i and zero otherwise. The regression results are
given in Table 1. The intercept provides an estimate for the deviation of
the overnight rate in the ﬁrst hourly band considered (9-10 a.m.) from the
daily average. The value of each βi provides an estimate of the change of the
o v e r n i g h tr a t eb e t w e e nt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h ed a ya n dt h eh o u r l yb a n dt = i.
As p-values show, all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at 5% level (with the only
10exception of β1).
Table 1 - Estimated regression
Coeﬃcient Value p-value βi − βi−1
c 2,002 0
β1 −0,378 0,207 −0,378
β2 −0,744 0,012 −0,366
β3 −1,567 0 −0,823
β4 −2,206 0 −0,639
β5 −2,129 0 0,077
β6 −2,659 0 −0,53
β7 −3,818 0 −1,159
β8 −4,518 0 −0,7
R2 0,8 Sum = −4,518
F − stat 49,78 Mean= −0,565
D.W. 1,962
It can be seen from the table that the overnight rate in the ﬁrst hourly
band is two basis points higher than the daily average. As the beta values
show, the overnight rate gradually declines during the day; in the last oper-
ating hour, its level is 4.5 basis points below the initial level. The last column
(βi − βi−1)s h o w st h a tt h ec h a n g eo ft h eo v e r n i g h tr a t ew i t hr e s p e c tt ot h e
previous hour is negative in all time bands, with only one exception (namely
between the 1-2 p.m. and the 2-3 p.m. bands).
The above evidence seems to conﬁrm the hypothesis that an implicit
intraday money market exists: the price of an overnight interbank loan does
depend on the length of the contract; in other words, the intraday term
structure of the overnight interest rate deﬁnes a strictly positive hourly rate
in the money market.
Equation (5), used for regression purposes, is an extension of equation
(4): the latter relies on the simplifying assumption that the hourly interest
11rate is constant throughout the operating day. A synthetic measure of the
hourly interest rate charged in the money market is obtained by restating
our results as in equation (6) below, by making use of the beta estimated
values. This provides an empirical evaluation of equation (4) above, and it
shows that the hourly price of money is estimated to be more than half a
basis point on average.
rt =2 .002 − 0.565t (6)
4 Summary and conclusions
We have presented a simple model, where intraday and overnight interest
rates are linked by a no-arbitrage argument: even when it is not possible
to replicate an overnight contract with intraday contracts, a relationship
between hourly and overnight interest rates must hold to avoid arbitrage
opportunities. Such a relationship makes the hourly rate be a function of the
intraday term structure of the overnight rate. This property holds under both
assumptions, where an explicit intraday market for interbank loans exists
and when it does not. In the ﬁrst case, such a property is an equilibrium
condition; in the second one it holds by deﬁnition, as a synthetic hourly loan
is a portfolio of overnight contracts.
We then provide empirical evidence, based on tick-by-tick data for the
e-MID money market (covering the whole 2003). The overnight rate shows a
clear downward pattern throughout the operating day. Therefore, a positive
hourly interest rate emerges from the intraday term structure of the overnight
rate: we estimate the market price of a one hour interbank loan to be slightly
above a half basis point.
Compared with previous results relative to the MID market (Angelini
2000), our estimates point to an evolution of the interbank market: a price
for intraday loans did not emerge during the mid nineties, while it does a few
12y e a r sl a t e r . T h i sp a t t e r nc o n ﬁr m sw h a tw ep r e s u m e di no u rI n t r o d u c t i o n ,
namely that the recent evolution of settlement procedures calls for a more
active intraday management of bank liquidity.
On the other hand, our estimate for a one hour interest rate is lower than
that (0.9 basis point) obtained by Furﬁne (2001) for the federal funds market.
T h er e a s o nm a yb ef o u n di nt h ea b s e n c eo fa ne x p l i c i tf e ef o rt h ei n t r a d a y
liquidity provided by the ECB, contrary to what happens in US. In the euro
area, the cost of the central bank intraday credit is only an implicit one,
namely the opportunity cost of pledging collateral. Actually, our estimate
for the intraday interbank interest rate might be interpreted as a market
price of collateral.
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